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CRITERIA IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
FREIGHT RATE DIVISIONS
Jervis Langdon, Jr.*
When a loaded freight car is moved by rail from a station in New
York to a delivery point in Georgia, a joint through rate is ordinarily
applicable. This means that all of the individual railroads which par-
ticipate in the through transportation have concurred in a rate of, say,
60 cents per hundred pounds, and that is what is collected, either at
origin by way of prepayment or at destination from the consignee. It is
here that the question of divisions is presented. How will the lines which
hauled this car, the Delaware & Hudson to Wilkes Barre, the Pennsyl-
vania to Potomac Yards (Washington), the Southern to Macon, and the
Central of Georgia to destination, divide the 60 cents? Ordinarily, there
is a form of agreement-manifested by a so-called divisions sheet.' But
the agreement is sometimes kicked overboard, or there is none, or there
has been a change in the conditions that existed when the divisional
basis was originally fixed.
The controversies, which go to the Interstate Commerce Commission'
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 271, for biographical data.
' A divisions sheet is a publication in the form of a tariff which is circulated among
connecting carriers to guide their auditors in the distribution of revenues arising from in-
terline traffic. Generally speaking, divisions sheets are not on public file.
2 Hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
Prior to the Hepburn amendment in 1906, the Interstate Commerce Act contained no
provision relating to divisions or their prescription by the Commission. The amendment,
enacted as part of what is now section 15 (1) and reenacted without change by the Mann-
Elkins Act, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) provided as follows:
Whenever the carrier or carriers, in obedience to such order of the Commission
or otherwise, in respect to joint rates, fares, or charges, shall fail to agree among them-
selves upon the apportionment or division thereof, the Commission may after hear-
ing make a supplemental order prescribing the just and reasonable proportion of such
joint rate to be received by each carrier party thereto, which order shall take effect
as a part of the original order.
The uncertainties as to the Commission's powers -under this provision led to the en-
actment of section 15 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act as part of the Transportation
Act of 1920 [Feb. 28, 1920, c. 91 § 418 (1920)] 49 U.S.C. § 15 (6) (1946). See Pittsburgh
& W. Va. Ry. v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 61 I.C.C. 272 (1921); New England Divisions,
62 I.C.C. 513 (1921), 66 I.C.C. 196 (1922), order sustained, Akron, C. & Y. Ry. v. United
States, 282 Fed. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd, New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184
(1923); also New England Divisions, 126 I.C.C. 579 (1927).
In addition to specifying the criteria enumerated in the text infra, section 15 (6),
presently in effect, provides as follows:
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in the first instance, fall into two types. The first is over primary
divisions of rates which apply between different rate territories. 3 In the
cited example, for instance, the Delaware & Hudson and the Pennsyl-
vania, along with other carriers operating north of the interterritorial
gateways, including Potomac Yards, would be ranged against the South-
ern and the Central of Georgia and all of the other Southern lines in a
contest over the primary revenue proportions which should accrue north
and south of the boundary line.4 These cases are apt to involve all of
the carriers in the respective freight rate territories and divisions of
rates on practically all traffic moving between them. The second type of
controversy is where an individual carrier is dissatisfied with the di-
visions which it receives, and these may be its divisions of rates apply-
ing on local traffic within the territory or its subdivisions of primary
divisions on interterritorial traffic.
But whether the controversy is between all of the railroads in one
territory and all of the railroads in another over primary divisions of
rates which produce annual freight revenues of hundreds of millions of
dollars,5 or between a single short-line railroad and its trunk-line con-
Whenever, after full hearing -upon complaint or upon its own initiative, the Commis-
sion is of opinion that the divisions of joint rates, fares, or charges, applicable to the
transportation of passengers or property, are or will be unjust, unreasonable, inequita-
ble, or unduly preferential or prejudicial as between the carriers parties thereto
(whether agreed upon by such carriers, or any of them, or otherwise established), the
Commission shall by order prescribe the just, reasonable, and equitable divisions there-
of to be received by the several carriers, and in cases where the joint rate, fare, or
charge was established pursuant to a finding or order of the Commission and the
divisions thereof are found by it to have been unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or
unduly preferential or prejudicial, the Commission may also by order determine what
(for the period subsequent to the filing of the complaint or petition or the making of
the order of investigation) would have been the just, reasonable, and equitable di-
visions thereof to be received by the several carriers, and require adjustment to be
made in accordance therewith.
3 The problem of dividing rates does not arise when a so-called combination of local
rates is applicable, and each carrier retains the rate which it contributes to the through
charge. In certain circumstances, however, rates which are the aggregate of interme-
diate rates become, in substance and effect, joint rates and as such, subject to the Com-
mission's power to divide. See Official Western Trunk Line Divisions, 269 I.C.C. 765,
778-782 (1948); Agwilines, Inc. v. Akron C. & Y. Ry., 248 I.C.C. 255, 273-274 (1941);
Southwestern-Official Divisions, 234 I.C.C. 135, 164-165 (1939).
4 In such a proceeding, subdivisions of the primary divisions among the carriers within
the two territories would not be in issue.
The boundary line between North and South is, generally speaking, the Ohio River
to Kenova, W. Va., and thence, a line extending through southern West Virginia and
Virginia to Hampton Roads, Va. Western territory is separated from the South and North
by the Mississippi River (with certain exceptions).
5 The estimated annual freight revenues which the Commission divided in the re-
cently concluded litigation between the railroads in the North (Official territory so-called)
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nection over revenues which the former requires to live,' there is no
difference in the criteria. Since 1920 they have been found in section
15 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act:
In so prescribing and determining the divisions of joint rates, fares, and
charges, the Commission shall give due consideration, among other
things, to:
[1] the efficiency with which the carriers concerned are operated,
[2] the amount of revenue required to pay their respective operating ex-
penses, taxes, and a fair return on their railway property held for
and used in the service of transportation, and
[3] the importance to the public of the transportation services of such
carriers; and
[4] also whether any particular participating carrier is an originating,
intermediate, or delivering line, and
[5] any other fact or circumstance which would ordinarily, without re-
gard to the mileage haul, entitle one carrier to a greater or less pro-
portion than another carrier of the joint rate, fare or charge.7
These criteria are not to be ignored. In Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co.
v. United States,' the Supreme Court annulled an order prescribing di-
visions in the making of which "the Commission failed to consider the
items definitely specified by section 15 (6)."
It is the purpose of this article to take a look at each of these statu-
tory criteria and to see how they have fared in actual application. In
the conclusion, it will be suggested that, if there is continued improve-
ment in the art of railroad cost-finding, one principal criterion for the
dividing of rates may in time emerge as presumptively correct, and this
will be the proportionate costs which the opposing carriers incur in pro-
viding their respective parts of the through service. If Carrier A or
the carriers in Region A have 57 per cent of the costs for the through
transportation, they should, in other words, receive 57 per cent of the
through revenues, provided of course the costs on both sides are no
higher than they should be and represent a service for which there is
an established public need.
and those in the South (Southern territory) amounted to 644 million dollars. Official-
Southern Divisions, 287 I.C.C. 497 (1953); 289 I.C.C. 4 (1953). This litigation is some-
times referred to herein as the recent North-South case.
A companion case involved the divisions of rates between the North and Southwest
(Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas). Official-Southwestern Divisions, 287 I.C.C.
553 (1953).
6 Cf. Montana Western Ry. Abandonment, 275 I.C.C. 512 (1951), upheld in Great
Northern Ry. v. United States, 343 U.S. 562 (1952).
7 See note 2 supra.
8 276 U.S. 109, 117 (1928).
1954]
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1. OPERATING EFFICIENCY
In accordance with the statute, the first criterion to which the Com-
mission "shall give due consideration" is "the efficiency with which the
carriers concerned are operated."
In no important divisions case has the Commission ever made a find-
ing of inefficiency as such.9 One reason is that, in most of the contro-
versies, there has been no such issue, and neither side has questioned
the efficiency of the other.'" Another reason is that inefficiency is hard
to prove. Comparative performance figures are held insufficient," and
testimony based on personal knowledge is largely unobtainable. Em-
ployees of the inefficient line are not going to admit inefficiency; and
employees of other lines, even if willing to talk publicly cannot speak
from personal knowledge and experience. Qualified outside experts
in the railroad field are few and far between, and in any event, their
principal reliance would have to be on "the comparison of mere figures"
which the Commission finds inadequate. 2
The importance of evidence of operating efficiency is in its bearing
upon transportation costs. In the recent North-South case, 13 as well as
9 Cf. Walter P. Gardner, Trustee of Central Railroad of New Jersey v. Akron, C. & Y.
R.R., 276 I.C.C. 655 (1949). There, the Commission reversed its prior action in 272 I.C.C.
529 (1948) and denied the Jersey Central increased proportions of the through rates to
and from New York to represent the added cost of its harbor floatage and lighterage
service. While the Commission's action was based on other grounds, it did cite its de-
cision in State of New Jersey v. B. & 0. R.R., 245 I.C.C. 581, 591 (1941), and pointed
out at 660-661:
So far as this record reveals, no substantial change has been made in the lighterage
service since that finding was made. Plainly, it would be inequitable to expect the
nonharbor lines, who are not in any way responsible for the harbor service, to bear
any part of the cost of furnishing such service which may be entailed by inefficient
operation.
10 Official-Western Trunk Line Divisions, supra note 3, at 744; Divisions of Rates,
Official and Southern Territories, 234 I.C.C. 175, 193 (1939) (herein sometimes referred
to as the former North-South case); Alton R.R. v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 215 I.C.C. 317,
321 (1936); Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain Pacific Territories,
203 I.C.C. 299, 304 (1934); Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I.C.C. 457, 473-474, 477
(1928); 156 I.C.C. 94, 101 (1929).
11 Official-Southern Divisions, supra note 5, at 512; Florida East Coast Ry. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 235 I.C.C. 211, 231 (1939).
12 Florida East Coast Ry. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 235 I.C.C. 211 at 231 (1939).
It may also be noted that a finding of inefficiency would in effect be an indictment of
individuals, and understandably, the Commission will not permit this if there is a plausi-
ble escape. Moreover, since World War II, successive freight rate increases have been
allowed on the finding, implied if not express, that the nation's railroads are operated
efficiently. Increased Freight Rates, 276 I.C.C. 9, 24-31 (1949).
13 Official-Southern Divisions, supra note 5
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in the companion one involving the primary divisions of rates between
the North and Southwest, 4 divisions to apply in the future were in
issue, and in seeking drastic revisions of the bases prescribed prior to
World War II, the Northern lines put their entire case-to all practical
purposes-upon a showing of higher post-war costs in their area than in
the other territories-an alleged reversal of the condition upon which
the Commission had previously acted. 5 To this position the answering
argument of the Southern lines was that relatively less efficient oper-
ations in the North since the War had produced expense levels in that
territory which, as compared with those in the South, could not "justifia-
bly be accepted as guides for the future." In a direct sense, the Southern
lines' argument was rejected because the Commission refused to find
the Northern operations relatively less efficient. In another sense, how-
ever, the Southern lines were partially successful, because the Commis-
sion set aside the expense levels in the North, as it understood them-the
same result which presumably would have followed a finding of relative
inefficiency. The following conclusions in the Commission's report are
pertinent:
... As indicated in the foregoing quotation from New England Divisions,
supra, the cost of service which is of prime importance in considering di-
visions is "cost under economical and efficient management." We do not
interpret section 15 (6) as requiring us to determine whether one group
of carriers is more or less efficiently operated than another, but rather to
give due consideration to any evidence which might tend to indicate that
the showing as to cost of service is affected by wasteful or inefficient
management.
... If we were to give controlling weight to the cost studies of the northern
lines for 1946 and 1948 in this record, the differentially higher basis of
divisional factors sought by those lines would be justified. We do not accept
that showing at face value because, admittedly, there were certain im-
portant items of expense in those years which may reasonably be re-
garded as transient, particularly in the northern lines' accounts for main-
tenance of way and structures and equipment. This was particularly
true of the Pennsylvania, which in 1948 and the two following years had
high freight-car repair costs apparently cyclic in nature. 16
While operating efficiency appears as the first of the statutory cri-
teria to guide the Commission in the fixing of divisions, it has no real
standing as a separate test. This is not because of the difficulty of
'4 Official-Southwestern Divisions, supra note 5.
15 In the former North-South case (Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Terri-
tories, note 10 supra), as well as Southwestern-Official Divisions, supra note 3.
16 Official-Southern Divisions, supra note 5, at 525-526.
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proof previously adverted to. Rather it is because evidence of efficiency
or inefficiency is principally important in interpreting the results pro-
duced by other criteria, such as comparative costs' 7 and relative reve-
nue needs."' Even if the statute failed to include this criterion, it is clear
that a display of higher costs by one side could be met by evidence that
such costs were higher than they should be, or a showing of greater
revenue needs'9 could be offset by evidence that such needs were greater
than they should be. Operating efficiency, as a separate criterion, makes
no separate contribution. It does help in appraising the value of other
tests, but such an appraisal would be obtainable (within the limits of
available proof) in any event.
2. REVENUE NEEDS
The second statutory criterion is "the amount of revenue required
to-pay their [the contending carriers'] respective operating expenses,
taxes, and a fair return on their railway property held for and used in
the service of transportation." This is usually referred to as the test of
relative revenue needs.
The litigation which this criterion has inspired has been extensive. In
the Commission's original report in New England Divisions2 ° it was
found that the lines in that territory, which were in financial distress,
could not force the lines west of the Hudson River to pay larger di-
visions "merely because" such western carriers "considered as a whole,
have not failed in so great a degree to earn a fair return upon the value
of their property devoted to the public service, although this is one
factor which may be taken into consideration."'" Commissioner East-
man vigorously dissented and, pointing to the statutory criterion pres-
ently under discussion (as well as the further one2 of "the importance
to the public of the transportation services of such carriers") said:
... It follows that we can attach no weight to these matters which have
.been given so much prominence -in the law unless we are prepared to
accept the conclusion that in some cases it may be just and equitable and
in the public interest to divide joint rates in disproportion to the amount
and cost of the service rendered.
It is, I think, an inevitable conclusion that Congress intended to give us
a wider jurisdiction and discretion in determining divisions than would
17 Official Southern Divisions, supra note 5.
18 The second statutory criterion which is discussed infra.
19 Ibid.
20 62 I.C.C. 513 (1921).
21 Id. at 562.
22 Considered infra.
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have been proper if such determination were viewed merely as an isolated
problem. In other words, divisions were regarded in connection with and
as a phase of the larger problem of assuring a national transportation
system sound and healthy in all its parts, and it was the definite intent to
permit us, in fixing divisions, to take into consideration this larger end.23
... I find no difficulty, therefore, in reaching the conclusion that in this
case we have both the right and the duty to consider, not only the rela-
tive importance and cost of the service rendered by the respective carriers,
but also the financial needs of the New England roads and the consequences
to the entire country if they should meet with serious financial trouble
2 4
Commissioner Eastman's view soon prevailed, and in its decision fol-
lowing reargument2 5 the Commission increased the divisions of the New
England lines because of their greater revenue needs. This action was
upheld in the courts. The Supreme Court, relying upon the "new rail-
road policy" introduced by the Transportation Act of 1920 which "sought
to ensure, also, adequate transportation service," held that the "division
of joint rates in the public interest" was one of "two new devices"
adopted to "secure revenues adequate to satisfy the needs of the weak
carriers."2 6 One year later, in 1924, the Supreme Court, referring to
its decision in the New England Divisions case, pointed out:
. .. It is settled that in determining what the divisions should be, the
Commission may, in the public interest, take into consideration the
financial needs of a weaker road; and that it may be given a division
larger than justice merely as between the parties would suggest "in order
to maintain it in effective operation as part of an adequate transporta-
tion system" provided the share left to its connections is "adequate to
avoid a confiscatory result."
'27
The exercise of this power to help lines with greater revenue needs has
since been reviewed on a number of occasions. In its report on further
hearing in New England Divisions2 8 the Commission issued a caution
against its misuse, and in Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co. v. United States,
the Supreme Court said that nothing in the New England Divisions case
23 62 I.C.C. 513, 568 (1921).
24 Id. at 569.
25 New England Divisions, 66 I.C.C. 196 (1922). See note 2 supra.
26 New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 189, 191 (1923). See note 2 supra.
27 United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274, 284-285 (1924).
28 126 I.C.C. 579 (1927). The Commission said at 599:
The dangers in such an assumption that deficiencies in local earnings must in-
evitably be made up on interchange business at the expense of connecting lines are
obvious. Communities and the roads which servp them might too readily arrive at
the conclusion that they are "unable" to increase local rates and, in disregard of
the principle of self-help, unduly rely upon others to carry their burdens. However,
it is clear that the financial needs of weaker lines are an important factor in our
consideration of divisions.
1954]
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"supports the view that the Commission may take something from one
carrier merely because its net revenue appears unduly large and donate
this to another demanding nothing and not in need. '2 9 In Beaumont,
S. L. & W. Ry. v. United States, the same court made it clear that, while
"The Commission must consider the financial conditions of the car-
riers . . . it is not required to make that the only test.""0 In a dispute
over divisions of rates on a single commodity (citrus fruit moving from
Florida to destinations north of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers) the
Commission, while rejecting the argument "that financial conditions can
be given weight only as a kind of last-resort remedy to prevent imme-
diate abandonment of the weaker road," took the much greater overall
revenue needs of the Florida lines into account,3' and this action the
Supreme Court expressly upheld. 2
The Commission has characterized as "unsound" the argument that
"divisions . . . cannot be increased merely because of . . . financial
needs unless the share left the connecting carriers constitutes a fair
return" and pointed out that:
We are not prevented from taking into account the financial condition
of the short lines in fixing divisions on the traffic here involved merely
because the aggregate earnings of the standard lines on all their business
are unsatisfactory to those lines.33
When disparate revenue needs have been assailed as reflecting differ-
ent results from passenger services, the Commission has employed a
formula for equalizing that influence. 4 This is not to say that passen-
29 276 U.S. 104 at 116 (1928).
30 282 U.S. 74 at 87 (1930).
3' Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., 198 I.C.C. 375 (1934). For the first
and principal report in the same proceeding, see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A.
R.R., 194 I.C.C. 729 (1933).
32 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 (1936). The Commission's de-
cision was also upheld against the contention that it "subordinated all other findings and
facts to the single element of financial need." See the opinion in the lower court, Baltimore
& 0. R.R. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1934). The contention so turned down
relied heavily upon Commissioner Eastman's dissent which said:
To reach their conclusions, the majority are obliged to lean on the fact that while
both sets of lines are badly off financially, the southern lines appear to be worse off
than the northern . . . while financial need is doubtless important, I cannot weigh
it in the balance near so heavily as do the majority.
194 I.C.C. 729, 762 (1933).
33 Short Lines' Divisions, Official Territory, 205 I.C.C. 61, 65 (1934).
34 Originally applied in Divisions of Freight Rate, supra note 10. The formula is de-
scribed in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., 194 I.C.C. 729, 755 (1933).
. . . The passenger operating ratio being higher in the southern district than that in
the eastern region, enough of the deficiency in the South may be apportioned to pas-
senger revenues to make the average passenger operating ratios the same in the two
groups. The remainder of the deficiency for the southern district is apportioned be-
between the two services in the ratio of the revenues as thus modified. In the case of the
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ger operations are properly eliminated when applying the yardsticks
which control the level of freight rate divisions. Quite the contrary is
true. Passenger operations are not only a factor in passing upon the
level of freight rates themselves, but they are also included when it
comes to the later division of those rates.35
In the recent North-South case,36 the Northern lines, which were the
moving parties, took the position that their allegedly greater revenue
needs should not be used as a basis of divisions more favorable to them
than "required" by the evidence of comparative costs." Their argument
was that "relative costs have come to be recognized as the measure of
relative revenue needs." 38 While the Commission found in its decision
that "relative revenue needs of opposing groups of railroads must be
taken into account in prescribing divisions," there was no indication that
they exerted any special influence or produced a result which otherwise
would not have been arrived at.39
Greater revenue needs are usually traceable to higher costs, though it
is of course possible to have them because the composition of the traffic
is less favorable,40 or the rates less well adjusted.41 But certainly the
eastern group the deficiency is apportioned between the two services without such
modification. . . .The constructive freight deficiency of the southern roads was 7.7
percent of their freight operating revenue, and that of the eastern lines was 6.6 per-
cent. The financial condition of the southern roads is therefore less favorable.
35 For a full discussion of the legal point, see the Commission's decision in Increased
Freight Rates, 276 I.C.C. 9 at 32-35 (1949). In the cited proceeding, proposed increases
in freight rates were justified in part by deficits in the passenger service, and in finding
that this justification was proper, the Commission observed:
The carriers seem to have come to this conclusion in their contentions among them-
selves as to the adjustment of their divisions, Florida East Coast Ry. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 235 I.C.C. 211 at 238. Huntingdon & B. T. M. R. & C. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 183 I.C.C. 685.
36 287 I.C.C. 497 (1953).
37 Ibid. In this litigation cited in note 5 supra, the Northern lines argued, at pp. 191,
354 of their original brief dated May 2, 1951, that they were "not seeking divisions 'larger
than justice merely as between the parties would suggest."' The quoted phrase is from
the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., note 27, supra.
38 See p. 3 of Northern lines' exceptions dated April 7, 1952, to Examiners' proposed
report.
39 Official Southern Divisions, 287- I.C.C. 497 (1953). The actual divisions prescribed
were equal prorating factors for equal distances in each territory, and on the question of
relative revenue needs the Commission observed that "in the 31-year period from 1921 to
1951 the annual average rates of return for the two groups of carriers were substantially
equal, 3.81 per cent for the southern lines and 3.85 per cent for the northern." (287 I.C.C.
497 at 504.)
40 A railroad with a preponderance of products of mines or manufactured goods as traffic
is presumably in a better revenue position than one which principally transports agri-
cultural products, animals, and animal products, or forest products. See first and prin-
cipal report in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., note 31 supra, at 758; also
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influence of the former in producing different revenue results is becom-
ing less as industrialization spreads through the South and West, and
the influence of the latter is diminished as rate levels tend to seek a
common level. The higher costs which greater revenue needs will or-
dinarily reflect arise from less operating efficiency, less traffic density,
greater investment costs, more terminal in relation to line-haul expense,
tougher terrain and weather conditions, and a number of other possible
causes. And when conditions of this kind are in fact the reason for
the greater revenue needs, there is no point in using such needs as a
separate test for divisions. This is because they are only a manifesta-
tion of an underlying condition-a higher cost level-which itself is
to be taken into account in dividing the rates. Like operating efficiency,
relative revenue needs as a statutory criterion make no separate con-
tribution-no contribution, that is, beyond the one made by the dis-
parate costs which almost always will be found to underlie different
revenue needs.
3. THE IMPORTANCE TO THE PUBLIC OF THE SERVICE INVOLVED
This is the third criterion. The Wording of the statute is that the
Commission in fixing divisions shall give due consideration to "the im-
portance to the public of the transportation services of such carriers."
For the most part, this test has been accepted by the courts and the
Commission as a requirement that the public interest be consulted in
the fixing of divisions,4" and as further support for divisions "larger
than justice merely as between the parties would suggest" in order to
maintain an adequate transportation system.43 In certain instances the
Commission, referring to this yardstick, has noted that the "importance
to the public of the transportation service rendered by each participat-
ing carrier is relatively equal," or that there is no dispute on this
North Carolina Corp. Comm. v. Akron C. & Y. R.R., 213 I.C.C. 259, 286-287 (1953).
But cf. Official-Southerh Divisions, supra note 39, at 523-524.
41 In the Commission's decision on reargument in New England Divisions, 66 I.C.C.
196, 202 (1922), it observed: "nor does the evidence indicate that the financial needs of
the New England lines are ascribable to the low level of their local freight rates or pas-
senger fares."
42 Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. United States, supra note 30, at 797; Brimstone R.R.
& Canal Co. v. United States, supra note 29, at 116; New England Divisions case, 261
U.S. 184, 194-195 (1923). See note 2 supra.
43 United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., supra note 27, at 284-285. In Commissioner
Eastman's dissent from the Commission's first decision in New England Divisions this
criterion of the "importance to the public of the transportation services of such carrier"
was linked with the one of relative revenue needs as granting the Commission "power to
deal with the critical situation which the case presents." [62 I.C.C. 513, 568-569 (1921)].
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point.44 In other instances, it has simply been taken "into considera-
tion. ' 4 5
If larger divisions are sought for the performance of service in
which there is little or no public interest, this is the criterion which
comes into play, but in the very nature of things such a situation is
not often presented. In a few cases the challenge has been there, but
the Commission has turned it down with the finding that "under exist-
ing conditions" the service "cannot be withdrawn without serious con-
sequences to all who are dependent upon its continuance," or "We have
no question that there is public necessity for the continued opera-
tion. 4 6 Increased divisions have, however, been denied where the addi-
tional service advanced as the justification (while benefiting the lumber
company which owned the line) was found to be "unnecessary and un-
economic ... and not in the public interest," and to fall "under the ban
of inefficiency."47 Increased divisions have also been withheld where the
routes were merely competitive and "relatively less important than those
of defendants as a whole.' 48 In connection with competitive routes be-
tween the North and Southwest which operated through the Southeast,
the Commission, on another occasion, said:
It would not be proper to discount the value of the service performed by
the southern carriers ... because their routes are alternative to others via
St. Louis. 49
Like the criteria of operating efficiency and relative revenue needs
discussed above, "the importance to the public of the transportation
services" provided by the carriers whose divisions are under review
44 Official-Western Trunk Line Divisions, 269 I.C.C. 765, 774 (1948); Divisions of
Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Territory, 203 I.C.C. 299, 304 (1934);
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. B. & 0. R.R., 174 I.C.C. 321, 331 (1931); Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. v. A. C. R.R., 153 I.C.C. 511, 547 (1929). Cf. first decision in New England Di-
visions, 62 I.C.C. 513, 516 (1921) where the Commission said: "'The importance to the
public of the transportation services of' the complainants is conceded, and of it we take
judicial notice, as well as of that of the principal defendants."
45 See second report in Divisions of Freight Rates, 156 I.C.C. 94, 101 (1929). See also
Commissioner Caskie, dissenting in part, in Florida East Coast Ry. v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 235 I.C.C. 211 (1939).
46 Divisions of joint Rates, etc. of Missouri & N. A. Ry., 98 I.C.C. 119, 124 (1925);
Freeman and Boettcher, Receivers v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 73 I.C.C. 178, 183 (1922). Cf.
Minnesota-Atlantic Transit Co. v. C. M. St. P. & P. R.R., 194 I.C.C. 111, 119 (1933).
47 Christie & Eastern Ry. v. K.C.S. Ry., 93 I.C.C. 675, 679 (1924).
48 Alton R.R. v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 215 I.C.C. 317, 322 (1936). When this litigation
reached the Supreme Court it merely held with respect to "the importance to the public
of the transportation services of such carriers," that the judgment of the court could be in-
voked as to whether this language meant the importance of the particular services provided
under the divisions in question or the importance of all the transportation services pro-
vided by complainants. Alton R.R. v. United States, 287 U.S. 229 (1932).
49 Southwestern-Official Divisions, 234 I.C.C. 135, 162 (1939).
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makes-as a separate test-no separate contribution. If the service
to the public is of questionable importance, the cost of providing it will
doubtless be high, and in dealing with the evidence of such high costs,
the way is certainly open to prove lack of public interest in a continu-
ation of the service. A specific statutory criterion is not needed for this
purpose.
4. ORIGINATING, INTERMEDIATE, OR DELIVERING SERVICE
The fourth criterion is "whether any particular participating carrier
is an originating, intermediate, or delivering line." The character of the
service has a direct bearing upon reasonable divisions.
In the days before the elaborate cost formulae which the cost sec-
tion of the Commission devised 0 in an effort to separate terminal from
line-haul costs-thus permitting a statement of average unit transporta-
tion expenses which could be applied to any length of haul, by different
types of equipment, including empty return movements-it was recog-
nized as a general rule that the carrier which originated or terminated the
traffic was entitled to more than its share of the revenues based on propor-
tionate mileage.51 As stated in the typical decision in Pittsburgh &
W. Va. Ry. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R.R., the "defendants concede that
complainants, as the line burdened with the cost of originating and
assembling the shipments, are entitled to relatively larger divisions in
proportion to length of haul than are the intermediate lines and, to a
lesser extent, the delivering lines." 5- Indeed, in New England Divisions
it was "the terminal character of complainants' operations" which was
at the bottom of the controversy, 53 and in the large divisions cases which
followed the proceedings elaborate and separate studies have usually been
submitted not only for the purpose of showing terminal costs as such but
50 Known as Rail Form A. See Sen. Doc. No. 63, 78 Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), entitled
"Rail Freight Service Costs in the Various Rate Territories of the United States"--Letter
from the Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission, transmitting in response to Senate
Resolution No. 119, certain information, etc. See also "Explanation of Rail Cost Finding
Procedures and Principles Relating to the Use of Costs," as prepared April, 1948, by the
cost section of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
51 Through Routes and Joint Rates, 174 I.C.C. 477, 485 (1931); Middle Creek R.R.
v. B. & 0. R.R., 168 I.C.C. 110, 116-117 (1930); U.S. War Department v. A. & S. Ry.,
92 I.C.C. 528-538 (1924). The usual allowance for terminal service was in the form of an
additional mileage block or constructive mileage Western Md. Ry. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
169 I.C.C. 495, 501 (1930); Manistee & N. Ry. v. Ann Arbor R.R., 160 I.C.C. 187,
193 (1929).
52 61 I.C.C. 272, 283-284 (1921).
53 62 I.C.C. 513, 517 (1921).
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also of emphasizing special terminal burdens,54 particularly in the origi-
nation and delivery of perishable shipments.55
As a corollary, the less costly nature of intermediate service has been
specifically recognized and acted upon, and "A reduction reflecting the
fact that they perform no origin or destination terminal service" was
ordered in the divisional factors for the Southern lines serving as a
bridge between the North and the Southwest.56 As stated in the Com-
mission's report:
... The fact that the southern roads are intermediate carriers performing
no originating or delivery service must, of course, be taken into account,
and we agree with defendants that any form of mileage prorate is par-
ticularly objectionable where it is applied to intermediate hauls of con-
siderable length.57
Again, in Official-Western Trunk Line Divisions it was found that:
The western lines are intermediate carriers with respect to this part of
the haul, and because of this circumstance, their divisions therefor may
properly be lower than those they receive on traffic originated or delivered
at the river crossings.58
This criterion is basic in the fixing of reasonable divisions. Its im-
portance as an abstract test, however, is diminishing as the technique
of cost-finding is improved, and it becomes more possible to spell out in
terms of actual figures (average though they be) the real meaning
of "whether any particular participating carrier is an originating, inter-
mediate, or delivering line." From a divisions point of view, there is
no significance as such in the performance of an originating service, or
an intermediate service, or a delivery service. What counts is the im-
pact upon costs, and the average figures, which can now be estimated,
are beginning to tell the story in this regard. With the availability of
even more cost data, it should some day be possible to spell out in
dollars and cents the actual significance of "whether any particular par-
ticipating carrier is an originating, intermediate, or delivering line."
54 Division of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, 234 I.C.C. 175, 209-215 (1939);
Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Territories, 203 I.C.C. 299,
318, 320-321, 324, 330-332, 338, 347 (1934) ; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R.,
194 I.C.C. 729, 742-743, 745-747 (1933).
55 Here the question often has been as to which of the terminal services-at origin
or destination-should outweigh the other. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade &
A. R.R., 194 I.C.C. 729, 746-747 (1933); Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and
Mountain-Pacific Territories, 203 I.C.C. 299, 320-321 (1934); Divisions of Rates, Official
and Southern Territories, 234 I.C.C. 175, 219 (1939).
56 Southwestern-Official Divisions, 234 I.C.C. 135 (1939).
57 Id. at 162.
58 269 I.C.C. 765 at 781 (1948).
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And when that time comes, the importance of this criterion as a sepa-
rate test will disappear because it will be able to reveal nothing which
will not be revealed by the costs themselves.
5. OTHER FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
The statute finally provides that the Commission shall consider "any
other fact or circumstance which would ordinarily, without regard to
the mileage haul, entitle one carrier to a greater or less proportion than
another carrier of the joint rate, fare or charge."
It will be recognized that this does not necessarily rule out mileage.
Rather, as stated by the Commission in its first decision in New England
Divisions:
The words "without regard to the mileage haul" do not forbid consider-
ation of the element of distance. They serve rather to emphasize the fact
that other specified elements may outweigh the element of distance in
which event we may properly disregard the mileage haul. The clause is
inclusive rather than exclusive, and the general words "among other
things" constitute a clear exposition of the intent of Congress that we
should consider all the facts and circumstances. 59
However, the "any other" facts or circumstances are the ones which
have dominated the decisions of the Commission, and they have di-
vided themselves into two categories. The first has included those
facts or circumstances which directly or indirectly bear upon transpor-
tation costs. The second has related to historical considerations, the
background of the divisions under review, and the level of the rates
being divided.
Looking at the first category, we find the Commission referring to the
population and the industrial and agricultural development of the areas
served by the carriers whose divisions are in dispute.60 These have im-
plications so far as traffic density is concerned, and traffic density in
turn may influence transportation costs."1 In the Commission's reports
too, there are found elaborate descriptions of the operating difficulties
encountered by the contesting railroads, including most particularly
those attributable to mountain grades, 2 excessive curvature,63 extreme
59 62 I.C.C. 513 at 560-561 (1921).
60 Official-Southwestern Divisions, 287 I.C.C. 553, 559-561 (1953) ; Official-Southern
Divisions, 287 I.C.C. 497, 501-503 (1953); Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Ter-
ritories, 234 I.C.C. 175, 198, 210 (1939); Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and
Mountain-Pacific Territories, 203 I.C.C. 299, 312 (1934); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Arcade & A. R.R., 194 I.C.C. 729, 749-750 (1933); Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I.C.C.
457, 464-466 (1928).
61 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. B. & 0. R.R., 16 F. Supp. 647, 652 (D. Md. 1936).
62 Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Territories, supra note
60, at 317-320, 340, 346-347.
63 Id. at 322-323, 340, 346-347.
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climatic conditions,"4 congested terminal areas," special services pro-
vided for special traffic such as perishables,66 and others. All of these
conditions suggest higher costs, 67 but as stated by the Commission in a
typical report, "they throw no light whatever on the extent" to which
the costs are higher.68 The same may be said of higher (or lower) wage
levels,6 9 remoteness from (or nearness to) sources of fuel,70 variations in
freight-car ownership costs,71 greater (or lesser) empty car mileage, 72
an obligation to weigh and bill the shipments, 73 more (or less) inter-
mediate transfers,7 4 and hundreds of other elements which, ultimately,
are translatable into terms of higher (or lower) transportation costs.
64 Id. at 317.
65 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra note 60, at 745, 748-749
(1921); New England Divisions, 62 I.C.C. 513, 527 (1921). Cf. Official-Southern Divisions,
supra note 60, at 538-539.
66 Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, supra note 60, at 210, 215-217
(1925); Erie R.R. v. A. & V. Ry., 98 I.C.C. 268, 273, 280 (1925). Cf. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra note 60, at 729, 743-744, 747, 757-758.
67 In Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Territories, supra
note 10, at 323, the Commission said:
Even though the study does not show the precise effect of grades and curves on the
various classes of train costs, it tends to confirm the common impression that the
cost of operation is increased by heavy gradients and many degrees of curvature.
68 In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra note 60, at 757, the Commis-
sion pointed out:
The voluminous evidence descriptive of operating conditions cannot be translated into
terms of costs for the purpose of comparing the two groups of roads in this respect.
To the same effect is the decision in Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-
Pacific Territories, supra note 60, at 317, where comparable operating details "have the
characteristic in common that they throw no light whatever on the extent to which aggre-
gate transportation costs west of the gateways on the transcontinental routes exceed those
east thereof, if they exceed them at all."
69 Short Lines' Divisions, Official Territory, 205 I.C.C. 61, 73 (1934); Divisions of joint
Rates, etc., of M. & N. A. R.R., 68 I.C.C. 47, 50 (1922) ; New England Divisions, 66 I.C.C.
196, 200, 209 (1922).
70 Carriers' Division of Bituminous Coal Rates, 85 I.C.C. 617, 625 (1924); New England
Divisions, supra note 69, at 200; Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-
Pacific Territories, supra note 60, at 318-319.
71 Florida East Coast Ry. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 235 I.C.C. 211, 229 (1939);
Short Lines' Divisions, Official Territory, 205 I.C.C. 61, 66 (1934); Strouds Creek & M.
R.R. v. B. & 0. R.R., 159 I.C.C. 601, 605 (1929); Chaffee R.R. v. Western Md. Ry., 102
I.C.C. 59, 60-61 (1925); Virginia Blue Ridge Ry. v. Southern Ry., 96 I.C.C. 591, 594
(1925). Cf. New England Divisions, supra note 65, at 537-538; Through Routes and joint
Rates, 174 I.C.C. 477, 478 (1931).
72 Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, supra note 60, at 215; Florida
East Coast Ry. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra note 71, at 222; Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra note 60, at 743, 758; Divisions of Freight Rates in
Western and Mountain-Pacific Territories, supra note 60, at 320.
73 Artemus-Je]lico R.R. v. L. & N. R.R., 132 I.C.C. 183, 185 (1927).
74 Southwestern-Official Divisions, 234 I.C.C. 135, 155 (1939); Divisions of Rates,
Official and Southern Territories, supra note 60, at 223.
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Density of traffic has often been referred to because of its effect upon
unit costs. In the Beaumont case the lower court held75 that it was not
essential for the Commission to "state the exact differences in the traffic
density and the weight to be attached thereto," and the Supreme Court
in turn held 71 that "the greater density found in western trunk line
territory makes for lower costs, and that is shown to have been taken
into account." But the Commission has been careful to note that the
fact of higher density "while it suggests that transportation costs on
the transcontinental routes are higher west than east of the gateways, is
not at all conclusive on that point, for there are many other factors to
be taken into consideration." 77 One is an appreciation of "the extent
to which heavier density necessitates greater capital expenditure."78s
Indeed, in referring to this element, the Commission has said that the
"vital thing to ascertain" in a divisions case is "obviously the relative
cost of service in the two groups, and upon that matter traffic density
throws only an indirect and not very illuminating light.' 7
In the prolonged controversy over divisions of citrus fruit rates from
Florida,80 the Southern lines laid great stress upon the heavy density
north of the principal gateway, Potomac Yard, and this factor was
doubtless responsible for saving the divisions which the Commission
prescribed against an attack by the Northern lines on the ground of con-
fiscation. The lower court found:
The special conditions surrounding the movement of citrus fruit,
and especially the transportation by the northern lines of trains made up
wholly or in large pait of citrus and other perishable foods delivered to
them in large quantities at a particular gateway, suggest that in a sense
the commodity is dealt with by them in wholesale rather than in retail
quantities.8 '
Differences in levels of traffic density, as a fact or circumstance
for the Commission to consider in a controversy over divisions, are
75 Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 36 F.2d 789 (W.D. Mo. 1929).
76 Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74 (1930).
77 Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Territories, 203 I.C.C.
299, 315 (1934).
78 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., 198 I.C.C. 375, 377 (1934). See also
fourth report in New England Divisions, 126 I.C.C. 579, 614 (1927).
79 Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I.C.C. 457 (1928) ; 156 I.C.C. 94, 100 (1929).
80 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra note 78.
81 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 181, 198 (El). Va. 1934), aff'd, 298
US. 349 (1936). In Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, 234 I.C.C. 175,
214 (1939), it was said:
The fact that the traffic [Florida vegetables] is received by the northern lines, par-
ticularly the Pennsylvania, which handles about 76 per cent of the Florida vegeta-
bles shipped to official territory, in heavy and fairly regular volume is entitled
to important weight.
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meaningful from a cost point of view and important -for that reason.
However, if reliable cost estimates are themselves available, the signifi-
cance of such differences in density largely disappears. The same is -true
of differences in other operating conditions which (again in the
absence of reliable cost evidence) have been treated in the decisions as
facts or circumstances bearing upon the proper level for divisions.
Turning now to the second kind of "any other fact or circumstance,"
it is found that the Commission, on several occasions, has been influ-
enced by historical considerations. If the complaining carriers have
been forced into the acceptance of certain divisions because of the com-
manding position of their connections as to the collectors of the freight
charges, that circumstance will be weighed and may weigh heavily.,2
Under other circumstances, divisions which have been in existence for
a long time without complaint have been held to raise no presumption
and to shed little if any light on what is correct."3 Divisions once fair
are no indication of present fairness."4
Aside from historical grounds, divisions have been attacked and de-
fended because of their relationship to the level of local rates. The
significance of such a yardstick 5 depends upon whether or not the rates-
82 Alton R.R. v. United States, 287 U.S. 229, 236 (1932); Backus Brooks Co. v. Northern
Pacific Ry., 21 F.2d 4, 16-18 (9th Cir. 1937); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 12 F.Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1935); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 9
F. Supp. 181, 199 (E.D. Va. 1934); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra
note 60, at 732-733, 756-757; 198 I.C.C. 375, 380-381 (1934). Divisions of Rates, Official
and Southern Territories, supra note 81, at 178, 180-181; New England Divisions, 126
I.C.C. 579, 615 (1927). See also Alabama'& M. R.R. v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 95 I.C.C.
385, 403 (1925).
83 In United States War Dept. v. A. & S. Ry., 155 I.C.C. 343, 347 (1929), the Commis-
sion observed that "The point of approach in the public regulation of divisions, also,
must of necessity be quite different from that of the railroads in their private negotia-
tions." In referring to carrier-negotiated divisions in Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I.C.C.
457, 459 (1928), the Commission said:
No doubt they were the result of bargain and trade and plainly they are not definitely
related to any of the criteria which we must consider in determining just, reasonable,
and equitable divisions.
For contrary rule prior to enactment of section 15 (6) see Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron
Co. v. L. & N. R.R., 35 I.C.C. 460, 465 (1915). See also Short Lines' Divisions, Official
Territory, 205 I.C.C. 61, 73 (1934).
84 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 82, at 722. On the other
hand, the Commission has said that changed conditions raise no presumption of unreason-
ableness in "old" divisions because "it may be that they were too liberal originally." New
England Divisions, 62 I.C.C. 513, 463 (1921).
85 A comparable yardstick has been the level of "other" divisions. For its importance
see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra note 60, at 738-739; Short Lines'
Divisions, Official Territory, supra note 83; Agwilines Inc. v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 248
I.C.C. 255, 260-261 (1941); Bellefonte Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 216 I.C.C.
39, 66 (1936).
1954]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
as the yardstick-are well adjusted and on a sound basis.80 If so, as
stated in the Commission's fourth report in New England Divisions,
they constitute "a very significant and valuable test of divisions.
' s7
However, as the Commission has also pointed out:
It is well known, as we have pointed out in numerous decisions, that
differences in the level of corresponding local rates within particular ter-
ritories very often do not accord with actual differences in transportation
conditions.
.. Superficially it would seem that divisions should never be higher than
corresponding local rates, but this does not necessarily follow. The im-
portant thing here is to establish a just, reasonable, and equitable basis
of divisions. That done, it is immaterial how it happens in particular
instances to compare with unrevised or even revised local rates.88
Prior to the uniform class rate levels which became effective as a
result of Class Rate Investigation, 1939,9 differences in such levels were
often relied upon, but the Commission never regarded them as important
in the controversies over divisions. In the first place, the differences did
not serve "as an index of the difference in general rate levels,"" ° and
secondly, "Class rates do not necessarily furnish an accurate index of
relative transportation costs." 91 The purpose of the evidence as to differ-
ent rate levels was to show, by indirection, disparities in underlying
transportation conditions, but as stated by the Commission in Divisions
of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Territories:
... The evidence in regard to rate levels, taken by and large, indicates a
recognition on our part of higher transportation costs in the territory
west of the gateways than in the territory east thereof, this tendency being
especially marked as to Mountain-Pacific territory. It is, however, not
conclusive evidence of higher transportation costs west of the gateways on
the traffic here in question, and throws no light on the extent of the excess
cost, if any exists. 92
When, during the depression years preceding World War II, the Com-
mission first undertook in the former North-South case to fix the di-
visions of most of the interterritorial rates applying between the two
86 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. A. C. R.R., 153 I.C.C. 511, 547-548 (1929); Laona & N.
R.R. v. M., St. P. & St. Ste. M. Ry, 52 IC.C. 7 (1919).
87 126 I.C.C. 579 at 590-591 (1927).
88 Divisions of Freight Rates, 156 I.C.C. 94, 96 (1929). Compare Southwestern-Official
Divisions, 234 I.C.C. 135, 139 (1939); Official-Western Trunk Line Divisions, 269 I.C.C.
769, 781 (1948).
89 262 I.C.C. 447 (1945); 281 I.C.C. 213 (1951).
90 Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I.C.C. 457, 468 (1928); New England Divisions, 126
I.C.C. 579, 606, 613 (1927).
91 Southwestern-Official Divisions, 216 I.C.C. 687, 709-710 (1936).
92 203 I.C.C. 299, 317 (1934).
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territories, comparative rate levels played an important part. 3 There,
it was established that the interterritorial rates, on the whole, were on a
higher level than those within the North, and the Commission observed
that:
Where the interterritorial rates have been made higher than those in the
North, the difference has been deemed to be warranted by the fact that
the transportation is partly performed by southern carriers and that the
conditions affecting the service were such that on the particular com-
modity involved the rates might properly be higher relatively than those
on similar traffic in the North. In view of the factors which have been
responsible for the measure of these rates, therefore, there is logic in
the argument of the southern lines that "the rates which contain some-
thing above the official level, because of the southern lines' participation,
should be divided so as to give the increment in the rate to the southern
carriers."
94
This was the so-called increment theory which the Commission took
"into account by allowing the southern lines divisional factors on gen-
eral traffic higher than those of the northern lines by a uniform per-
centage." 95 In the cited case there was no finding of relative costs in
the two territories partly because of the inconclusive nature of the sta-
tistical averages which were then available and partly because of "the
fact that the interterritorial rates themselves have not been based upon
ascertained differences in such costs."96 Almost 15 years later, when
these same divisions were reviewed in the recent North-South case, the
rate increments were found to be disappearing and, in any event, the
evidence as to costs, according to the Commission, did not support
higher divisions in the South than in the North.97 Whether or not the
93 Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, 234 I.C.C. 175 (1939).
94 Id. at 190.
95 Id. at 191.
96 Id. at 190. See note 103 infra.
97 Official-Southern Divisions, 287 I.C.C. 497 (1953). Under the increment theory it
will be appreciated that, as stated by the Commission, at 523:
Recognition of the increment theory in our 1939 report made it logically necessary to
prescribe a special basis of divisions for those rates which contained no increment.
At the time of the former North-South case [Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern
Territories, 234 I.C.C. 175 (1939)] such rates were strictly limited. But they grew in im-
portance as more traffic from the South was placed on a competitive level with that in
the North, and the Commission prescribed interterritorial rates on the so-called destina-
tion rate level. In certain instances, the so-called equal factors which the Commission
prescribed in the former North-South case for the division of rates with no increment
gave the Northern lines larger earnings from the reduced interterritorial rates than they
had previously obtained from the higher interterritorial rate level.
In connection with the Commission's reliance upon the increment theory in the former
North-South case, the following observation on the part of the Examiners in their pro-
posed report (sheet 27) in the recent North-South case (Official-Southern Divisions, 287
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increment theory was sound would seem to depend upon the accuracy
with which the increments reflected the then differences in underlying
transportation conditions (including, of course, the then differences in
the distribution of the transportation burden).
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held:
* . . There is no single test by which "just," "reasonable" or "equitable"
divisions may be ascertained; no fact or group of facts may be used gen-
erally as a measure by which to determine what divisions will conform
to these standards. Considerations that reasonably guide to decision in
one case may rightly be deemed to have little or no bearing in other
cases.
98
The Commission has said the same thing by emphasizing that "Under
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act no one element which we are
required to consider is controlling.. All pertinent factors must be con-
sidered." 99 It has also observed that "Obviously it is impossible to
apply any mathematical formula which will operate with precision, and
it is necessary to be guided by general judgment after considering and
weighing as well as we can the evidence before us."'100 It has also
pointed out that "Examination of our prior decisions will show that
we at all times have asserted it to be our duty to consider each divisional
controversy coming before us strictly on its own merits without regard
to any fixed basis or general standard of divisions."''
It is doubtless true that the Commission, with the support of the
courts, has decided each divisions controversy "without regard to any
fixed basis or general standard," and that no- one element has been "con-
trolling." In referring to the statutory criteria, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that their purpose "is to empower and require the Commis-
sion to make divisions that colloquially may be said to be fair."'0 2
Nevertheless, in looking to the future, it should come as no surprise
if a single basis for the establishment of divisions becomes presump-
I.C.C. 497 (1953)-an observation which incidentally did not find its way into the Com-
mission's final report-is worthy quoting:
In the former proceedings the Southern lines relied on their "increment" argument to
bolster an admittedly deficient showing of comparative costs, and the Commission
accepted that substitute.
98 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 359 (1936).
90 New Jersey and N.Y. R.R. v. Erie R.R. (1953), mimeographed. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. v. A. C. R.R., 153 I.C.C. 511, 547; New England Divisions, 62 I.C.C. 513, 561
(1929).
100 Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I.C.C. 457, 477 (1928) ; 156 I.C.C. 94, 103 (1929).
101 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., 198 I.C.C. 375, 379 (1934).
102 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, supra note 98.
[Vol. 39
1954] FREIGHT RATE DIVISIONS
tively correct, and if this happens, the presumption will be in favor of
proportionate costs, adjusted (if required and the evidence is avail-
able) to reflect future probabilities under efficient operations. While this
prediction postulates further improvements in the art of railroad cost
finding, the Commission could-even today--come close to justifying it
on the following grounds:
First, proportionate costs, if determinable, produce the results which
the Commission has apparently had in mind to produce for some time.10 3
The significance of the element of cost has always been recognized, and
in certain decisions it has been referred to as "vitally important in the
determination of divisions.' 0 4  Until recently, however, there has been
little beyond the start of a technique, and the Commission, in conse-
quence, has had to resort to a number of different factors which were
no more than substitutes-substitutes which, as we have seen, included
comparisons of specific elements which presumably bore upon costs or
influenced them or reflected them. There has been no alternative-par-
ticularly in the large interterritorial disputes-because the statistical
averages tendered as "comparative costs" for the lines in the several
regions have been far from trustworthy for a variety of reasons.105
103 In Divisions, of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, supra note 97, at 189-190,
the Commission said:
These differences make it hazardous to express a definite opinion as to relative costs
of transportation in the two territories. . . .The statistical evidence, unsatisfactory as
it is, leads to the conclusion that transportation costs on the traffic here considered
may properly be considered to be higher in the South, and that, although the exact
degree of difference is indeterminable, it is not negligible, as the northern lines argue.
We do not understand that the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act relating
to divisions require us to make specific findings as to cost of service where, as here,
the record would not permit such findings. It is true that in Divisions of Freight
Rates, 156 I.C.C. 94, 103, in prescribing divisions of rates between southwestern and
western trunk-line territory we expressed the general conclusion that the cost of
service in the Southwest was "somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 per cent greater"
than in western trunk-line territory. That conclusion was based on ton-mile figures,
but average hauls were about the same and no very important differences in compo-
sition of traffic were shown. We stated, however, that "the final result was not the
product of the statistics alone, but was reached in the exercise of judgment after
considering all of the pertinent evidence."
Another reason which makes it unnecessary for us to attempt a definite appraisal of
relative transportation costs is the fact that the interterritorial rates themselves have
not been based upon ascertained differences in such costs.
104 Official-Western Trunk Line Divisions, 269 I.C.C. 765, 776 (1948). In other de-
cisions, costs have been characterized as the "essential question," the "prime," or "para-
mount" consideration. Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Ter-
ritories, 203 I.C.C. 299, 311 (1934); Strouds Creek & M. R.R. v. B. & 0. R.R., 159 I.C.C.
601, 608 (1929). In still other decisions, costs have been minimized as "an element," "not
the only" criterion and "not necessarily determinative." Brimstone R.R. & Canal Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 104, 116 (1928); United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274
(1923); Hudson & Manhattan R.R. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 270 I.C.C. 739 (1948).
105 A comparison of average ton-mile or car-mile costs is almost meaningless unless
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With the availability of more accurate costs, this secondary evidence
will fade out of the picture. There will not be much point, for instance,
in considering different traffic densities in a division case if the costs
which are influenced thereby are available. Nor will there be any real
reason for taking into account different rate levels as reflecting (pre-
sumably) different underlying transportation conditions if the basic
costs-which are the primary evidence-are within reach and there is
no important difference in the distribution of the transportation burden
among commodities. In the recent North-South case, as well as the com-
panion one involving divisions between the North and Southwest,' the
apparent basis for the prescribed divisions was comparative costs, as
indicated above, and in employing it, the Commission, among other
things, contrasted the evidence then available to it with that submitted
at the time of the former North-South case. It said:
Shortly afterward [after the decision in the former North South case]
we established a cost-finding section, which is now a part of our Bu-
reau of Accounts and Cost Finding, having as one of its objects the
development of improved methods for determining transportation costs.
After exhaustive investigation that section constructed what has come to
be known as Rail Form A, a formula for determining railroad freight
service costs, including a separation of the line-haul and terminal elements
and a differentiation in respect to load and tare weights per car.1°7
The day will probably never come when further improvement in
the technique of cost finding will not be looked for. As it is now,
the so-called Form A 08 devised by the Commission's cost section is ad-
justable only in limited respects for specific traffic and specific operating
conditions, and its probative value, therefore, is in direct' ratio to the
scope of the controversy. Stated differently, the more the divisions in
dispute the better the chance that average costs, which are still the
end product of Form A, will fit. The only alternative is an expensive and
endless series of special cost studies of specific movements and services,
but even then, there is no avoidance of the problem of apportioning joint
expenses.
average hauls are identical, the ratio of net to gross load the same, and the traffic com-
position substantially comparable. See Southwestern-Official Divisions, 234 I.C.C. 135, 148-
152 (1939); Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, supra note 97, at 186-
190; Divisions of Freight Rates in Western and Mountain-Pacific Territories, supra 102
at 326, 327, 335, 340-341; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Arcade & A. R.R., supra note 104,
at 752, 757.
106 Official-Southwestern Divisions, 287 I.C.C. 553 (1953); Official-Southern Divisions,
supra note 97.
107 Official-Southern Divisions, supra note 97, at 507.
108 See note 50 supra.
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Second, proportionate costs would seem to satisfy each of the statu-
tory criteria previously discussed and, in fact, serve as a sort of com-
posite edition of all of them.
The first statutory criterion, it will be recalled, is "the efficiency with
which the carriers concerned are operated." This makes no separate
contribution as a test but comes into play, if at all, as a modifying
influence in the comparison of costs. Certainly the only costs which
could be controlling in a divisions case would be those which, as stated
by the Commission, accrued "under economical and efficient manage-
ment."' 09 The second statutory criterion, "the amount of revenue re-
quired to pay their respective operating expenses, taxes, and a fair
return on their railway property held for and used in the service of
transportation," makes no greater contribution as a separate test. This
is for the reason that greater or lesser revenue needs will usually be
caused by greater or lesser costs, and a recognition of the latter in the
fixing of divisions will automatically constitute a recognition of the
former. The third criterion is "the importance to the public of the trans-
portation services of such carriers." Here again, the differences if any
will be revealed by evidence as to costs, and services for which there is
questionable public need can be dealt with in exactly the same way as
services which are costly because of inefficiency. The fourth statutory
criterion, "whether any particular participating carrier is an originat-
ing, intermediate, or delivering line," is also significant because of its
cost implications and is fully satisfied by a showing of the costs them-
selves.
The statute does include as a final criterion "any other fact or
circumstance which would ordinarily, without regard to the mileage haul,
entitle one carrier to a greater or less proportion than another carrier."
But as we have seen, most of the "any other" facts or circumstances
which have entered into the Commission's decisions would be included in,
or reflected by, a showing of proportionate costs. Since such a showing
would only be presumptively correct, the way would always be open to
overcome the influence of proportionate costs if the impact of some
"other fact or circumstance" were so heavy as to require it in the inter-
est of "divisions that colloquially may be said to be fair."110
Third, the presumption in favor of a well-defined and single standard
for divisions would encourage the carriers to compose their differences
among themselves and to keep their controversies within the industry.
109 Official-Southern Divisions, supra note 97, at 524.
110 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, supra note 98.
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If it were generally understood that resort to the Commission would
probably bring about divisions in accordance with a formula which the
carriers might as well apply at home, there should be more of an in-
clination to stay at home and to settle their differences there. It is still
a prerogative of railroad management to agree upon divisions, and every
opportunity for its exercise should be afforded. The Commission already
has enough responsibilities without having to take on those which the
carriers-although having the right-are disinclined to discharge them-
selves.
